Data Ownership by Scassa, Teresa
CIGI Papers No. 187 — September 2018
Data Ownership
Teresa Scassa 

CIGI Papers No. 187 — September 2018
Data Ownership
Teresa Scassa 
Copyright © 2018 by the Centre for International Governance 
Innovation
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for 
International Governance Innovation or its Board of Directors. 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution — 
Non-commercial — No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit 
(www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or 
distribution, please include this copyright notice.
Printed in Canada on paper containing 100% post-consumer  
fibre and certified by the Forest Stewardship Council®  
and the Sustainable Forestry Initiative.
Centre for International Governance Innovation and CIGI are 
registered trademarks.
67 Erb Street West 
Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 6C2
www.cigionline.org
CIGI Masthead
Executive
President Rohinton P. Medhora
Deputy Director, International Intellectual Property Law and Innovation Bassem Awad
Chief Financial Officer and Director of Operations Shelley Boettger
Director of the Global Economy Program Robert Fay
Director of the International Law Research Program Oonagh Fitzgerald
Director of the Global Security & Politics Program Fen Osler Hampson
Director of Human Resources Laura Kacur
Deputy Director, International Environmental Law Silvia Maciunas
Deputy Director, International Economic Law Hugo Perezcano Díaz
Director, Evaluation and Partnerships Erica Shaw
Managing Director and General Counsel Aaron Shull
Director of Communications and Digital Media Spencer Tripp
Publications
Publisher Carol Bonnett
Senior Publications Editor Jennifer Goyder
Publications Editor Susan Bubak
Publications Editor Patricia Holmes
Publications Editor Nicole Langlois
Publications Editor Lynn Schellenberg
Graphic Designer Melodie Wakefield
For publications enquiries, please contact publications@cigionline.org.
Communications
For media enquiries, please contact communications@cigionline.org.
 @cigionline
Table of Contents
vi About the Author
vii About the Program
vii Acronyms and Abbreviations
1 Executive Summary
1 Introduction 
3 Understanding Data
4 Ownership under Existing Laws
11 Confidential Information/Trade Secrets
13 Personal Information  
13 Proposals to Change Rules of Ownership
14 Ownership of Personal Data
14 Data Ownership Right
15 Data Sovereignty
16 Challenges with Data Ownership Rights
18 About CIGI
18 À propos du CIGI
vi CIGI Papers No. 187 — September 2018 • Teresa Scassa 
About the Author
Teresa Scassa is a senior fellow with CIGI’s 
International Law Research Program. She is also 
the Canada Research Chair in Information Law 
and Policy and a full professor at the University of 
Ottawa’s Law Faculty, where her groundbreaking 
research explores issues of data ownership and 
control. Teresa is an award-winning scholar 
and is the author and editor of five books and 
more than 65 peer-reviewed articles and book 
chapters. She has a track record of interdisciplinary 
collaboration to solve complex problems of law 
and data and was part of the Geothink research 
partnership. Teresa is a founding member of the 
University of Ottawa’s Centre for Law, Technology 
and Society, is cross-appointed to the School of 
Information Studies at the University of Ottawa, 
and is a member of the Geomatics and Cartographic 
Research Centre at Carleton University.
At CIGI, Teresa’s research focuses on the legal 
challenges associated with data ownership 
and the need for a national data strategy in a 
data-driven economy. Her research also covers 
the governance of smart cities’ data and its 
implications for innovation, transparency, 
accountability, sovereignty and privacy.  
Teresa has worked as a consultant for government 
and the private sector and has also worked 
with non-governmental organizations on issues 
within her areas of legal expertise. She is a past 
member of the External Advisory Committee of 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
and of the Canadian Government Advisory 
Committee on Open Government. Teresa holds 
degrees in civil and common law from McGill 
University, as well as an LL.M. and a doctorate 
from the University of Michigan. She clerked 
for Mme Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé at the 
Supreme Court of Canada from 1988 to 1989.
viiData Ownership
About the Program
The International Law Research Program (ILRP) 
at CIGI is an integrated multidisciplinary 
research program that provides leading 
academics, government and private sector 
legal experts, as well as students from Canada 
and abroad, with the opportunity to contribute 
to advancements in international law.
The ILRP strives to be the world’s leading 
international law research program, with 
recognized impact on how international law 
is brought to bear on significant global issues. 
The program’s mission is to connect knowledge, 
policy and practice to build the international law 
framework — the globalized rule of law — to 
support international governance of the future. 
Its founding belief is that better international 
governance, including a strengthened international 
law framework, can improve the lives of people 
everywhere, increase prosperity, ensure global 
sustainability, address inequality, safeguard 
human rights and promote a more secure world.
The ILRP focuses on the areas of international 
law that are most important to global innovation, 
prosperity and sustainability: international 
economic law, international intellectual property 
law and international environmental law. In its 
research, the ILRP is attentive to the emerging 
interactions among international and transnational 
law, Indigenous law and constitutional law.
Acronyms and 
Abbreviations
AI artificial intelligence
BCFNDGI British Columbia First Nations’ 
Data Governance Initiative
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
IP  intellectual property
OCAP ownership, control, access 
and possession
SCC Supreme Court of Canada
TPMs technological protection measures
TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights
WCT WIPO Copyright Treaty
WIPO World Intellectual Property 
Organization
WPPT WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty

1Data Ownership
Executive Summary
The rapid expansion of the data economy raises 
serious questions about who “owns” data 
and what data “ownership” entails. In most 
jurisdictions, data that are kept confidential 
can be protected as confidential information. 
However, such data are vulnerable to exposure 
through hacking or leaking by third parties. 
In many instances, significant stores of data 
cannot be kept confidential, and protection must 
be sought elsewhere. Copyright law has long 
treated facts as being in the public domain, but 
will provide protection for compilations of facts 
that meet the threshold for “originality.” Such 
protection is considered to be “thin,” as it does 
not extend to the underlying facts, applying only 
to their original selection or arrangement. In the 
European Union, database rights offer a more 
robust protection for compilations of data, but 
they also fall short when it comes to protecting 
the facts that make up such compilations. 
Debates over ownership rights in data have been 
heating up. In Europe, policy makers have raised 
the possibility of creating sui generis ownership 
rights in data. In Canada, a recent court decision 
has raised the interesting question of whether 
facts and data should be treated differently 
in copyright law, offering a far more robust 
protection for data than for facts. In addition 
to these developments, Europe’s new General 
Data Protection Regulation also appears to 
vest certain rights in data subjects through the 
newly introduced concept of data portability.
If data are capable of ownership, either through 
a sui generis right or copyright law, this raises 
important questions about how to strike a balance 
between the rights of data “owners” and the public 
interest in access to and reuse of data. This paper 
will explore the legal basis for claims of ownership 
of data, the extent of the public interest in access 
to and use of data, and the areas in which public 
policy development is required to address the 
changing needs of the data economy and society.
Introduction 
Data have shifted from being a by-product of 
industrial, commercial, consumer and other 
activities to being a resource in their own right. 
The commercial value and importance of data is 
such that they have been referred to as the “new 
oil,”1 although many are quick to point out that 
data are an infinitely renewable resource.2 Unlike 
oil, the same data are also capable of being used 
by multiple actors and for multiple purposes. 
Data are the stock-in-trade of some of the world’s 
largest corporations; they are also increasingly seen 
as the source of answers to society’s problems. 
In this context, it is not surprising that data 
ownership issues have taken on great significance. 
Ownership claims and legal skirmishes over 
rights to own or control data arise in a number of 
contexts (see Table 1, below). The announcement 
of a smart city collaboration between Waterfront 
Toronto and Sidewalk Labs, for example, has 
generated considerable discussion about who will 
own any data generated by the smart city.3 In the 
United States, ongoing litigation between LinkedIn 
and companies that scrape LinkedIn’s platform 
data raises a host of issues around ownership 
and control over publicly accessible platform 
data.4 In the personal data context, there has 
1 See e.g. “The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data”, 
The Economist (6 May 2017), online: <www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-
worlds-most-valuable-resource>. Kurtis McBride suggests that data is the 
new oil “[b]ecause it creates class warfare” (Kurtis McBride, “Monetizing 
Smart Cities: Framing the Debate” CIGI, Data Governance in the 
Digital Age Special Report, 28 March 2018, online: <www.cigionline.
org/articles/monetizing-smart-city-data?utm_source=twitter&utm_
medium=social&utm_campaign=data-series>. 
2 See e.g. Bernard Marr, “Here’s why data is not the new oil”, 
Forbes (5 March 2018), online: <www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2018/03/05/heres-why-data-is-not-the-new-
oil/#7951cd6c3aa9>; Adam Schlosser, “You may have heard data is 
the new oil. It’s not”, World Economic Forum (10 January 2018), online: 
<www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/data-is-not-the-new-oil/>. 
3 See e.g. Teresa Scassa, “Who owns all the data collected by ‘smart 
cities’?”, Toronto Star (23 November 2017), online: <www.thestar.com/
opinion/contributors/2017/11/23/who-owns-all-the-data-collected-by-
smart-cities.html>; McBride, supra note 1; Bianca Wylie, “Civic Tech: 
The City of Toronto must remain a public platform”, The Torontoist (10 
January 2018), online: <https://torontoist.com/2018/01/civic-tech-
keeping-city-public-platform/>. 
4 See e.g. Kate Conger, “LinkedIn sues anonymous data scrapers”, 
TechCrunch (15 August 2016), online: <https://techcrunch.
com/2016/08/15/linkedin-sues-scrapers/>. See also hiQ Labs Inc v 
LinkedIn Corp, Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC (ND Cal 2017), online: <https://
regmedia.co.uk/2017/08/14/hiqlinkedintro.pdf>. 
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been considerable discussion about individuals’ 
ownership rights in their personal information,85678 
including arguments that individuals should be 
able to monetize their personal data.9 Indigenous 
5 See e.g. Toronto Real Estate Board v Commissioner of Competition, 2017 
FCA 236 [Toronto Real Estate Board].
6 See e.g. Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34, s 79(5).
7 Note that there are other contexts in which data ownership rights may 
serve the public interest. For example, Giuseppina D’Agostino et al 
argue that “IP is an important legal tool for controlling and protecting 
medical data.” See Giuseppina D’Agostino et al, “On the importance of 
intellectual property rights for e-science and the integrated health record” 
(2008) 14:2 Health Informatics Journal 95 at 98.
8 For example, see Jamie Lund, “Property Rights to Personal Information” 
(2011) 10:1 Northwestern J Technology & Intellectual Property 1–18; 
Jane B Baron, “Property as Control: The Case of Information” (2012) 18 
Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 367–418. 
9 For example, see Michelle Dennedy & Sagi Leizerov, “On monetizing 
personal information: A series”, The Privacy Advisor (26 September 
2017), online: <https://iapp.org/news/a/on-monetizing-personal-
information-a-series/>; Michael Haupt, “Introducing Personal Data 
Exchanges & the Personal Data Economy”, Project 2030 (7 December 
2016), online: <https://medium.com/project-2030/what-is-a-personal-
data-exchange-256bcd5bf447>. This is discussed in greater detail in the 
subsection entitled “Data Ownership Right”, below.
data activists in Canada place the concepts of data 
ownership, control, access and possession at the 
heart of Indigenous data sovereignty.10 In each of 
these examples, the value and importance of data 
is evident. Claims to ownership may be linked to 
the facilitation of commercial exploitation, but 
some claims also serve broader public interests.
The rights associated with ownership provide 
a powerful basis for control. A data owner can 
provide access to data or can restrict access 
partially or entirely. Data owners can impose 
conditions on access or use, including charging 
fees. Yet, if rights of ownership are recognized, 
the power to control information resources must 
have limits as well. IP laws create a balance of 
public and private interests; any data ownership 
rights must similarly include exceptions that are 
10 See e.g. First Nations Information Governance Centre (FNIGC), 
Ownership, Control, Access and Possession (OCAP): The Path to First 
Nations Information Governance (Ottawa: FNIGC, 2014) [FNIGC, 
OCAP], online: <https://fnigc.ca/sites/default/files/docs/ocap_path_
to_fn_information_governance_en_final.pdf>. This is discussed in greater 
detail in the subsection entitled “Data Sovereignty”, below.
Table 1: Contexts in which Data Ownership Issues Arise
Data ownership can play a role in commercializing data: It is common for companies and organizations to 
seek to control the data they collect through their activities in order to commercialize them. An ownership 
right can support various techniques for control, including contracts/licensing and technological protection 
measures.
Data ownership can create monopolies: Regulators have already recognized the competition/antitrust 
issues that may arise from excessive concentrations of certain types of data in the hands of one or only a few 
companies.5 Data ownership rights have a complicated relationship with competition law. This is, in part, 
because competition law creates some space for monopolies arising from intellectual property (IP) rights.6 
Data ownership can have public dimensions: The open data movement involves governments making 
government data available for reuse under open licences. Underlying open data licences are claims to 
government ownership rights in the data. This is an example of where data ownership is used to pursue a 
particular public policy agenda.7 Governments also have the option to not licence data as open data and, 
instead, to generate revenue through its sale, or to sell the data on a cost-recovery basis.
Data ownership may be challenging to locate: The recent Sidewalk Toronto smart cities project announced 
for Toronto has sharpened the focus on the importance of data ownership rights data within public-private 
partnerships involving the collection and/or generation of data. Who owns the data will have important 
implications not just for the ability to commercialize the data or to use or reuse it in the public interest; 
the location of ownership will also determine whether public or private sector data protection laws apply, 
whether the data can be sought through access to information requests, and even whether public-sector data 
localization laws will apply to prevent the storage of the data in another country.
Data ownership may play a role in privacy protection: Another dimension of ownership relates to privacy. 
The evolving European model of data protection will give individuals increased control over their data, 
including rights of erasure and data portability rights. These are quasi-ownership rights and may conflict with 
IP-style ownership rights in data. 
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appropriate for the public interest. The ability 
to access and use data is crucial to innovation, 
knowledge, transparency, accountability, 
expression and privacy. Further, not all rights 
or interests associated with data are ownership 
rights and, in some cases, different rights and 
interests may be layered with ownership rights.
Because the focus of this paper is on data 
ownership, the section entitled “Understanding 
Data” begins with an examination of what is 
meant by data. This is followed in the next section, 
entitled “Ownership under Existing Laws”, 
by a discussion of the different legal regimes 
relevant to arguments about data ownership. 
The section, entitled “Proposals to Change Rules 
of Ownership”, looks at potential alternatives 
to data ownership rules, including ownership 
rights in personal information, a sui generis data 
ownership right and data sovereignty claims. 
The paper concludes in the section entitled 
“Challenges with Data Ownership Rights” with 
an assessment of the existing frameworks 
for data ownership and an identification of 
those areas requiring policy attention.
Understanding Data
Understanding what is meant by the term data and 
by related terms, such as information and facts, 
is important given that, to the extent that there 
are any data ownership rights, they must attach 
to something about which there can be a clear 
consensus. Although the law has already grappled 
with concepts of ownership in relation to facts and 
information, the case law reveals inconsistencies 
in the understanding of these concepts.
Rob Kitchin describes three initial broad categories 
of data: data that are representative in nature, 
data that are implied and data that are derived.11 
Representative data are typically those that involve 
some kind of measurement, such as a person’s age, 
the ambient temperature or the volume of traffic 
on a given road. Implied data are those read into an 
absence, such as inferences drawn about a person’s 
voting preferences based on his or her online 
11 Rob Kitchin, The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data 
Infrastructures & their Consequences (London: Sage, 2014) at 1.
activity. Derived data are those that are “produced 
from other data.”12 These distinctions are important, 
and, as will be discussed below, early case law 
around data ownership evolved predominantly 
around representative data. In the context of big 
data13 analytics, implied and derived data take on 
great importance and may include data profiles or 
predictive data. As will be seen in the discussion 
below, the distinction between representative data, 
on the one hand, and implied or derived data on 
the other is important to understanding some of 
the challenges with how the law addresses data 
ownership, in particular in the context of IP law.
Another important, although often overlooked 
feature of data is their non-neutrality. Kitchin 
writes that “data are in fact framed technically, 
economically, ethically, temporally, spatially and 
philosophically. Data do not exist independently 
of the ideas, instruments, practices, contexts, 
and knowledges used to generate, process and 
analyse them.”14 Data inherently reflect choices 
— choices about which data to collect (or to 
exclude) and what tools or parameters will be 
used in their collection. In the case of derived 
data, the data reflect the many choices that went 
into determining how they would be processed 
and for what ends. These choices reflect the 
human agency present in the creation of data. 
The discussion of data also requires consideration 
of the concept of facts, which should not be 
conflated with data. Some see facts as the building 
blocks of data; in other words, facts occupy the 
role of the representative data referred to by 
Kitchin, whereas data are derived from them. In 
law, some courts have gone farther, attributing 
to facts an objective reality.15 Some courts have 
treated facts as existing independently of those 
who record them, the latter being characterized as 
the “discoverers” of those facts.16 Yet, to the extent 
12 Ibid.
13 Kitchin, supra note 11 at 68, notes that big data is often understood in 
relation to the concepts of volume, velocity and variety. Big data is huge 
in volume in that it exists in terabytes or petabytes; it is high in velocity in 
that it is created in real or near-real time; and it is available in a variety 
of formats. Other characteristics that may separate big data from small 
data are that it is “exhaustive in scope,” “fine-grained in resolution,” 
“relational in nature” and “flexible.” 
14 Ibid at 2.
15 In the Canadian case R v Allen [2006] AJ No 411 at para 11, the court, in 
noting that there can be no copyright in facts, bluntly stated: “Facts exist.”
16 Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340 at 347 
(1991) [Feist].  
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that measurements are collected and recorded, for 
example, they inevitably reflect human choices. 
Further, not all facts are as simple as recorded 
measurements. In their book on the construction 
of facts in science, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar 
characterize scientific activity as “a fierce fight to 
construct reality” and consider scientific facts as 
“the set of statements considered too costly to 
modify constitute what is referred to as reality.”17 
Another term that sometimes clouds the 
discussion is information. Information can be 
understood as contextualized facts. Robert Losee 
notes that a common definition of information 
is “one or more statements or facts that are 
received by a human and that have some form 
of worth to the recipient.”18 While facts are raw, 
information is processed. For example, a reporter 
might collect different facts; her newspaper 
article contextualizes those facts and constitutes 
information. Copyright law recognizes this 
distinction. While it would protect her article 
as a “literary work,” the facts embedded in the 
account would be considered in the public 
domain. Anyone would be free to take and reuse 
the facts, so long as they did not reproduce the 
original expression.19 Yet, it can be difficult in 
some cases to distinguish between representative 
facts and information. This is not helped when 
the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. 
Distinguishing between data and the works that 
contain them has taken on new significance 
in the big data era, as technology now permits 
the mining of data from all kinds of works, and 
those data have applications that go beyond the 
creation of new works. For example, a photograph 
is a copyright-protected work; facial recognition 
software can extract data about features from a 
photograph to create a faceprint that can be used 
in identifying the individual. From a copyright 
perspective, the question would be whether the 
faceprint is a reproduction of a substantial part 
of the protected expression in the photograph or 
whether all that has been extracted are public 
domain facts. Controversy currently swirls around 
the use of literary works to train algorithms for 
machine learning. Although these works must be 
17 Bruno Latour & Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of 
Scientific Facts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) at 243.  
18 Robert M Losee, “A Discipline Independent Definition of Information” 
(1997) 48:3 J American Society for Information Science 254 at 255.
19 Maltz v Witterick [2016] FCJ No 484, 2016 FC 524 at para 36 [Maltz].
copied in bulk for this purpose, they are not being 
used as “works,” but rather as masses of data with 
uses that go beyond their original expression.20 
While it is not necessary to resolve these issues 
for the purposes of this paper, it is important to 
emphasize that the fact/data distinction is an 
important one for copyright law and is central 
to thinking about rights of data ownership.
Ownership under  
Existing Laws
As data take on an increasingly important economic 
role, the existing frameworks for IP ownership are 
called upon to provide some form of protection 
for rights in data. In practical terms, ownership 
rights are frequently asserted in data, although 
the nature, scope and robustness of these rights 
may be uncertain and contingent. In most cases, 
claims of ownership are based in copyright 
law or asserted under the laws of confidential 
information. In Europe, database protection laws 
also play a role. In addition to IP frameworks, data 
protection laws, which place individual control/
consent at the heart of the protection of personal 
information, have created a context in which 
this element of control elides with the concept of 
ownership, supporting a growing discourse around 
individual ownership of personal information.
Copyright
Copyright law is an important source of contemporary 
claims to ownership rights in data. Where copyright 
arises, the author of a work is automatically 
protected (without need for registration) for 
the full term of protection.21 Because the right 
is automatic and of considerable duration, and 
20 See e.g. Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio & Oleksandr Bulayenko, 
“The Exception for Text and Data Mining (TDM) in the Proposed Directive 
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market – Legal Aspects” (2018) 
Center for International Intellectual Property Studies Research Paper No 
2018-02, online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3160586>; European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016) 593 final, 2016/0280 (COD), online: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/proposal-directive-
european-parliament-and-council-copyright-digital-single-market>. 
21 In Canada, this is the life of the author plus an additional 50 years; in the 
United States and the European Union, it is life plus 70 years.  
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because it applies to all manner of expressive 
works, there are numerous exceptions to copyright 
protection, including fair dealing (or the related 
concept of fair use in the United States). 
Copyright protection is available for literary, dramatic, 
artistic and musical works. These categories are 
defined broadly. For example, literary works have 
been found to include functional works, such as 
lists, menus, instructions and computer programs.22 
Artistic works include charts, plans, maps and 
graphic design, among others. The Copyright Act 
also recognizes that “compilations” consisting 
of multiple works of the same or different kinds, 
as well as compilations of fact, are also works in 
which copyright subsists.23 The inclusivity of these 
broad categories is mitigated somewhat by the 
further requirement that a work be original. 
Originality in Canadian copyright law has three 
main components. To be original, a work must not 
be a mere copy of another work;24 it must also be the 
product of an exercise of skill and judgment.25 Implicit 
in the skill and judgment requirement is the further 
requirement that there be a human author.26 Although 
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) characterized this 
threshold for originality as lying somewhere between 
the British “sweat of the brow” standard and the US 
22 Teresa Scassa, “Originality and Utilitarian Works: The Uneasy 
Relationship between Copyright Law and Unfair Competition” (2004) 1 
University of Ottawa Technology LJ 51.
23 Section 2 of the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, defines “compilation” 
as “(a) a work resulting from the selection or arrangement of literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic works or parts thereof, or (b) a work resulting 
from the selection or arrangement of data.”
24 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339, 
2004 SCC 13 (CanLII) at para 25 [CCH Canadian Ltd], online: <http://
canlii.ca/t/1glp0>.
25 Ibid at para 16. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the court, stated: “By 
skill, I mean the use of one’s knowledge, developed aptitude or practised 
ability in producing the work. By judgment, I mean the use of one’s 
capacity for discernment or ability to form an opinion or evaluation by 
comparing different possible options in producing the work. This exercise 
of skill and judgment will necessarily involve intellectual effort.” 
26 See CCH Canadian Ltd, supra note 24 at para 15. The issue of human 
authorship has arisen in the context of compilations of facts. For example, 
in the Australian case of Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories 
Company Pty Ltd, [2010] FCA 44 at paras 90–91, 333, the court found it 
impossible to identify a human author for the telephone directory compiled 
through automated processes. In Geophysical Service Inc v Encana Corp, 
2016 ABQB 230, 38 Alta LR (6th) 48, aff’d 2017 ABCA 125, leave to 
appeal denied 2017 CanLII 80435 (SCC) [Geophysical Service Inc], the 
court rejected arguments that the collection of seismic data, collected 
through the use of sophisticated technology, lacked a human author. Justice 
Eidsvik found that “[h]uman input is involved continuously through the 
acquisition stage, like creating a sound recording” (ibid at para 90). She 
noted that whether there was human authorship or not was an issue to be 
decided on the facts of a particular case.
standard that requires a scintilla of creativity,27 the 
reality is that the Canadian standard is comparable 
to those relied upon in the United States and the 
European Union, as well as in many other countries.28
No Copyright in Facts or Ideas
While the categories of works are interpreted broadly 
and inclusively, some subject matter is automatically 
excluded from protection under copyright law. Thus, 
there is no protection for ideas in the abstract — only 
for an original expression of ideas.29 Even where an 
idea is expressed in an original way (for example, in a 
book or movie), the idea may still be used by another 
in an independent work without infringement, so long 
as the original expression of the idea is not copied.30 
Similarly, facts are not protectable under copyright 
law. Facts are considered to be the building blocks of 
knowledge and innovation, and copyright law has 
been careful not to permit their monopolization. The 
US Supreme Court has stated: “[A]ll facts — scientific, 
historical, biographical, and news of the day, may 
not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain 
available to every person.”31 According to the SCC, 
“copyright protection only extends to the expression 
of ideas as opposed to the underlying ideas or facts.”32 
Justice Reed of the Federal Court described the 
proposition that facts are in the public domain as “trite 
law.”33 Thus, even where a work expresses facts in an 
original way, another party is free to extract those 
facts and use them in another work — providing they 
do not copy the original expression of those facts.34 
Copyright in Compilations
As noted above, a work must be original to be 
protected by copyright. The originality standard 
is applied to works differently, depending on 
27 Ibid at paras 15–16.
28 See e.g. Daniel Gervais, “Canadian Copyright Law Post-CCH” (2004) 
18 IPJ 131. The standard in the United Kingdom may lean more toward 
recognizing industrious creation as a basis for copyright protection than 
does the Canadian standard, as noted by the SCC in CCH Canadian Ltd, 
supra note 24.
29 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks, 
2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 59–60.
30 See e.g. Maltz, supra note 19.
31 Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340, 111 S 
Ct 1282 at 348 (1991) [Feist].
32 CCH Canadian Ltd, supra note 24 at para 15.
33 Hager v ECW Press Ltd, [1999] 2 FC 287, 1998 CanLII 9115 (FC) at para 
44, online: <http://canlii.ca/t/1hcj4>.
34 Ibid; Maltz, supra note 19.
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their nature. In the case of compilations, it is the 
authorial contribution of the person who created 
the compilation that is assessed, since this is 
what copyright seeks to protect. The author of 
a compilation is not generally the author of the 
individual works of which it is composed (for 
example, the creator of an anthology of stories is 
not typically the author of the stories it contains). 
The originality of a compilation, therefore, lies in 
the work of its author in selecting and arranging 
the different elements it contains.35 If there is an 
original selection or arrangement, this can give 
rise to copyright protection. The extent of the 
protection is limited to the original selection or 
arrangement — it does not extend to the individual 
elements that make up the compilation. Thus, 
copyright in a compilation of facts is infringed if 
someone takes a substantial part of the author’s 
original selection or arrangement of those facts.36 
In the case of compilations of facts, courts have 
found that telephone directories are not sufficiently 
original to give rise to copyright protection, 
since neither the selection of the individual facts 
contained therein, nor their arrangement (in 
alphabetical order) are original.37 Even so, the 
threshold for originality is not particularly high. 
For example, thematic telephone directories may 
be protected by copyright if the theme reflects an 
original selection.38 Nevertheless, compilations 
of fact present many challenges when it comes 
to copyright. “Whole universe” sets of fact may 
not reflect an original selection; similarly, where 
facts are arranged according to industry norms or 
standards, the compilation may lack originality.39 
A data set that is constantly growing (for example, 
35 Robertson v Thomson Corp, [2006] 2 SCR 363, 2006 SCC 43 (CanLII), 
online: <http://canlii.ca/t/1pqw1>; Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc v 
American Business Information, Inc (CA), [1998] 2 FC 22 [Tele-Direct].
36 CCH Canadian Ltd, supra note 24 at para 33.
37 In Canada, see e.g. Tele-Direct, supra note 35. The US Supreme Court 
reached a similar conclusion in Feist, supra note 31.
38 See e.g. ITAL-Press Ltd v Sicoli, [1999] FCJ No 837 (FC); B & S 
Publications Inc v Max-Contacts Inc, [2001] AJ No 143. In the United 
States, see Key Publications Inc v Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises 
Inc, 945 F (2d) 509 (2nd Cir 1991). 
39 See e.g. Tele-Direct, supra note 35. Industry standards, which may 
be relevant, but are not determinative of the originality enquiry, are 
considered in Harmony Consulting Ltd v GA Foss Transport Ltd, 2011 FC 
340 at paras 34, 39, 65, 77, 182–188, 92 CPR (4th) 6, aff’d 2012 FCA 
226 at paras 37–38, 107 CPR (4th) 1; Geophysical Service Inc, supra 
note 26 at para 105. In Toronto Real Estate Board, supra note 5 at para 
194, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the process by which the 
Toronto Real Estate Board compiled its data was a “mechanical exercise” 
and that the compilation therefore lacked originality.
streamed sensor data) may similarly be incapable 
of being a compilation since there is never a 
completed work. Even if a selection or arrangement 
is original, the principle that facts are in the public 
domain means that only the original selection or 
arrangement of the compilation will be protected; 
anyone who extracts facts from the compilation 
using an independent selection and arrangement 
of those facts has not infringed copyright. 
This has led the US Supreme Court to describe 
copyright in factual compilations as “thin.”40
The Database Industry and Database Rights
Before considering copyright issues in relation 
to data, it is important to reflect on the historical 
context in which the jurisprudence around 
copyright in facts has evolved. At one point, courts 
in North America and the United Kingdom showed 
a tendency toward recognizing the considerable 
effort that often went into compiling a collection 
of facts. This sweat-of-the-brow doctrine reflected 
concerns about unfair competition and recognized 
that a competitor of a compiler of facts could 
profit from the effort involved in creating the 
compilation to the detriment of the party that had 
invested the time, energy and money necessary 
to create it in the first place.41 To a large extent, 
this doctrine arose and was developed in a pre-
digital era, when collection and compilation was 
often a painstaking and laborious enterprise.
The case law that disrupted the trend toward 
sweat of the brow arose in the 1990s, at a time 
when digital technologies were emerging, creating 
greater opportunities for the automated collection 
and processing of facts. The signature cases in 
the United States and Canada that dismissed 
sweat of the brow as a basis for finding copyright 
in a compilation of facts involved telephone 
directories. Their backstories also revealed concerns 
about monopolies,42 as well as the potential 
for stifling innovation in spin-off products that 
40 Feist, supra note 31 at 349.
41 For a discussion of the historical evolution of the approach to copyright in 
facts, see Miriam Bitton, “Feist, facts and functions: historical perspective” in 
Robert F Brauneis, ed, Intellectual Property Protection of Fact-based Works: 
Copyright and Its Alternatives (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009).
42 At the time, telephone service providers had privileged access to 
subscriber data and often also had statutory obligations to produce 
telephone directories for public use. In this context, copyright protection 
of the resulting directories would actually enhance an already existing 
monopoly without providing any additional incentive to collect the facts or 
produce the directories. 
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might be developed using facts. Courts were 
applying copyright law principles within a very 
particular economic and technological context. 
For example, the US Supreme Court, in explaining 
the rationale for facts remaining in the public 
domain, used the example of a census taker as 
a collector of facts, ruling that such individuals 
“copy these figures from the world around them.”43 
The model was of individualized, painstaking 
recording of representative facts.  
Following the decision in Feist, concerns over the 
vulnerability to unfair competition of producers 
of compilations of data led to calls on both sides 
of the Atlantic for new legislation to specifically 
protect databases. In Canada and the United States, 
the choice was made to do nothing — essentially 
allowing the database industry to emerge and 
evolve in a context in which protections other than 
copyright law would also play a role.44 In Europe, 
however, the decision was made to create a sui 
generis database right.45 The European Database 
Directive required member states to enact laws that 
would protect the investment that went into the 
creation of databases. At the heart of such protection, 
however, was not a property right in data, but rather 
the protection of the investment made in structuring 
the data — in other words, in creating the database.46 
As Thomas Hoeren notes, any investment in the 
creation of the data themselves is not protected.47 
Copyright in Data
The historical context around the exclusion of 
facts from copyright protection and the limited 
protection available for compilations of fact 
is important because in the big data era, this 
context has markedly changed, and there is 
reason to believe that case law is also beginning 
to shift as well. Massive advances in digital 
technologies mean that the collection of data 
is constant and ubiquitous — it is often not the 
painstaking, resource-intensive or laborious 
43 Feist, supra note 31 at 347.
44 For example, contractual terms of use are commonplace.
45 EC, Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, [1996] OJ, 
L 77/20, online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:HTML> [European Database Directive].
46 Thomas Hoeren, “Big Data and the Ownership in Data: Recent 
Developments in Europe” (2014) 12 EIPR 751 at 752.
47 Ibid, citing British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Organization Ltd 
(C-203/02) [2004] ECR I-10415; [2005] 1 CMLR 15 at para 33.
process that gave rise to sweat-of-the-brow 
approaches, nor is it the automated but bounded 
collection and compiling of facts that made up 
the more recent era. Today, data are not just 
collected ubiquitously and continuously, they are 
processed, analyzed and stored in increasingly 
complex ways; they are also used to generate 
new data in the form of profiles, predictions 
and analytics. In this context, a focus on the 
originality of selection or arrangement is quickly 
overwhelmed by the human and technological 
processes that underlie the big data economy.
Within this evolving context, the importance of the 
definitions considered at the outset of this paper is 
evident. Copyright law clearly does not protect facts 
— facts are considered to be in the public domain. 
However, it is less clear that data are not protected. 
This view finds some support in the international 
treaty context. Article 2(8) of the Berne Convention 
provides that “[t]he protection of this Convention 
shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous 
facts having the character of mere items of press 
information.”48 This suggests that while certain types 
of facts are in the public domain, others may not 
be. The distinction between “mere” facts and the 
more complex concept of data may also be evident 
in the wording of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement), which provides in article 10(2) that:
Compilations of data or other material, 
whether in machine readable or other 
form, which by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of their contents constitute 
intellectual creations shall be protected 
as such. Such protection, which shall 
not extend to the data or material itself, 
shall be without prejudice to any copyright 
subsisting in the data or material itself.49
48 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 
September 1886, 25 UST 1341, 828 UNTS 221 (amended 28 September 
1979) [emphasis added], online: <www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/
text.jsp?file_id=283698>. 
49 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C: 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299 art 10(2) (entered into force 1 
January 1995), online: <www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips_01_e.htm> [TRIPS Agreement] [emphasis added]. Also note 
that the North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 
1992, Can TS 1994 No 2, 32 ILM 289, 605 (entered into force 1 
January 1994) (Ottawa: Supply & Services, 1993), online: <www.
nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Texts-of-the-Agreement/North-American-
Free-Trade-Agreement?mvid=1&secid=b6e715c1-ec07-4c96-b18e-
d762b2ebe511#A1705>, contains similar wording in article 1705(1).
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While on the one hand, this might be read 
as acknowledging the potential for separate 
copyright to exist in the elements of a compilation 
(such as individual stories in an anthology), 
the reference to “any copyright subsisting in 
the data” leaves open the possibility that, while 
copyright in a compilation of data does not 
extend to the underlying data, it is possible that 
a separate copyright might subsist in the data. 
There are numerous instances in copyright 
jurisprudence where courts have equivocated 
about the nature of facts. A pair of US cases is 
illustrative. In Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol 
Publishing Group, Inc.,50 the court had to determine 
whether well-known trivia about episodes of the 
popular television series Seinfeld were facts (and 
therefore in the public domain and available to 
the creator of a trivia game based on the series), 
or a substantial part of the copyright-protected 
work that was the series. The court characterized 
the trivia as “expression” created by the authors 
of the series.51 It also distinguished between real 
facts (such as the names of the actors who play 
the characters) and fictionalized facts (those 
arising from events in the series). In Warner Bros. 
Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books,52 a court reached a 
similar conclusion about the defendant’s lexicon, 
which was derived from the Harry Potter series of 
novels. According to the court, “[e]ven if expression 
is or can be used in its ‘factual capacity,’ it does not 
follow that expression thereby takes on the status 
of fact and loses its copyrightability.”53 In both 
of these cases, the courts recognized a degree of 
authorship in the creative facts, making them an 
integral part of the expressive work as a whole. 
The case of facts arising from fictional works 
might be considered particular, but the argument 
that other types of data are authored arises 
in other circumstances as well.54 In New York 
Mercantile Exchange Inc. v. Intercontinental Exchange 
50 Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc v Carol Publishing Group, Inc, 150 F (3d) 
132 (2nd Cir 1998). 
51 Ibid at 139.
52 Warner Bros Entertainment Inc v RDR Books, 575 F Supp (2d) 513 (SDNY 
2008).
53 Ibid at 536.
54 For a discussion of claims to copyright in bus timetable data, see Teresa 
Scassa, “Copyright Reform and Fact-Based Works” in M Geist, ed, From 
“Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”: Canadian Copyright and 
the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 571.
Inc.,55 the US Court of Appeal for the Second 
Circuit considered claims that the defendant’s 
copying of settlement prices generated by the 
plaintiff ’s algorithm amounted to copyright 
infringement. Ultimately, the court characterized 
the issue as one of determining “the line 
between creation and discovery,”56 in other 
words, whether the plaintiff was the author of 
the settlement prices or merely their discoverer. 
It considered this to be a “close question.”
Similarly, in BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,57 
the court considered arguments that calculated 
percentages were original and therefore protected 
by copyright. The court seemed to accept the 
possibility that some facts could be authored, but 
observed that “when confronted with raw data 
that have been converted into a final value through 
the use of a formula, courts should put significant 
weight on the degree of consensus and objectivity 
that attaches to the formula to determine whether 
the final value is fundamentally a ‘fact.’”58 The 
court attempted to distinguish between facts that 
merited protection and those that did not, stating:
If the data purports to represent actual 
objective prices of actual things in the 
world — the actual price of an actual 
settlement contract on a particular 
day — it is an unprotectable fact; if the 
data purports to represent an estimated 
price of a kind of idealized object — 
for instance, what a hypothetical, 
mint condition 2003 Ford Taurus with 
approximately 60,000 miles might be 
worth — then the hypothetical price may 
be eligible for some form of copyright 
protection in the right circumstances.59
These decisions leave open the possibility that some 
data might be entitled to copyright protection.
55 NY Mercantile Exch, Inc v Intercontinental Exchange, Inc, 497 F (3d) 109 
(2d Cir 2006) [NY Mercantile Exch].
56 Ibid at 114. See also RBC Nice Bearings, Inc v Peer Bearing Co, 676 F 
Supp (2d) 9, 21 (D Conn 2009), which found that data derived from 
a series of calculations carried out by the plaintiffs still fell within the 
category of facts.
57 BanxCorp v Costco Wholesale Corp, 978 F Supp (2d) 280 (SDNY 2013).
58 Ibid at 300.
59 Ibid at 301. The court in this passage is referencing CCC Information 
Services, Inc v Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc, 44 F (3d) 61 (2d Cir 
1994). 
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The merger doctrine was ultimately relied upon 
in Mercantile Exchange to avoid a finding of 
copyrightability. This same doctrine was also 
invoked in Banxcorp. The merger doctrine is 
interesting in this context and may have a role to 
play in considering whether data are copyrightable. 
The merger doctrine, which has been considered, 
although not expressly adopted by courts in 
Canada,60 is based on the principle that there can 
be no copyright in either facts or ideas, but only 
in their original expression. Where the expression 
of a fact or an idea merges with that fact or idea, 
(for example, where there is only one or a very 
limited number of ways to express it), there can 
be no copyright protection since the practical 
result of any such protection would be to give a 
monopoly over the fact or idea. For example, the 
court in NY Mercantile Exchange ruled that the 
merger doctrine applied to the settlement prices, 
stating that “[b]ecause any settlement price for a 
particular futures contract would be determined 
based on the same underlying market facts, any 
dissension would be exceptionally narrow.”61 
The role of the merger doctrine in determining 
whether implied or derived data can be protected 
by copyright is intriguing. NY Mercantile Exchange 
suggests that derived data can be authored and 
therefore original. However, such data, to the extent 
that they represent the idea behind the analytics 
that led to their creation, reflect a merger of idea 
and expression. If this is the case, then it would 
seem that derived data must necessarily remain 
in the public domain, except where there is no 
merger between idea and expression. The challenge 
will be in determining when no merger occurs.
The merger doctrine aims to avoid giving a 
monopoly to one party over an idea, thus 
preventing others from engaging with that idea 
expressed in its simplest form. However, an 
expansive application of the merger doctrine 
60 See e.g. Delrina Corp v Triolet Systems Inc (2002), 17 CPR (4th) 289 
at paras 48–52 (Ont CA), leave to appeal refused, [2002] SCCA No 
189, (2002), 305 NR 398 [Delrina]. Although no Canadian court has 
expressly adopted the merger principle, it is consistent with Canadian 
copyright law principles and has been referenced in many cases. See e.g. 
Delrina (ibid); Distrimedic Inc v Dispill Inc, [2013] FCJ No 1093 at para 
323; Red Label Vacations Inc v 411 Travel Buys Ltd, 2015 FC 18, 473 FTR 
38 at para 98.
61 NY Mercantile Exch, supra note 55 at 118. The merger doctrine was also 
applied to disqualify copyright protection for facts generated through a 
company’s own calculations in BanxCorp, supra note 57. The court also 
held that, considered individually, the facts (calculated percentages) were 
too short to constitute expressive works.
might stifle innovation if innovators lose all 
advantage in generating new works because 
others are free to copy and use them. However, in 
NY Mercantile Exchange, the court noted that the 
plaintiff produced the settlement figures in order to 
facilitate futures trading and that this was the only 
incentive needed to produce them. From a public 
policy point of view, copyright protection would 
merely block others from using the figures rather 
than support the continued creation of the figures 
by the plaintiff. The court, thus, also relied on the 
purpose of copyright law as a means to determine 
whether copyright protection was warranted.
In Geophysical Service Inc. v. Encana Corp,62 a judge 
of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench made an 
interesting distinction between public domain 
facts and copyrightable data. The case involved, 
among other things, claims of copyright in the 
plaintiff ’s seismic data about the ocean floor. The 
data were collected through a process that required 
considerable skill, as well as time and resources. 
Justice Eidsvik divided the data into two categories: 
field data and processed data. The field data were 
the raw data collected using the plaintiff ’s tools 
and technology. The processed data were defined 
as “any product derived, generated or created from 
the data, including, but not limited to any and all 
processed and reprocessed data, interpretations, 
maps or analyses, regardless of the form or medium 
on which it is displayed or stored.”63 Justice Eidsvik 
found that the field data were a compilation, while 
the seismic data were either a compilation or an 
artistic work, depending on their representation. 
She found that both categories of data met 
the threshold for originality, as each required 
considerable skill and judgment for their creation. 
Although technology played a considerable role 
in the collection and generation of the data, there 
was still sufficient human authorship to give rise 
to copyright. Justice Eidsvik concluded that the 
data were “an expression of GSI’s [Geophysical 
Services Inc.’s] views of what the image of the 
subsurface of the surveyed areas represents.”64 
She considered the uncopyrightable facts to exist 
in the features of the sub-ocean landscape; by 
contrast, the data were the details collected about 
62 Geophysical Service Inc, supra note 26.
63 Ibid at para 58, quoting from the Association of Professional Engineers, 
Geologists and Geoscientists of Alberta, Guideline for Ethical Use 
of Geophysical Data, vol 1, online: <www.apega.ca/assets/PDFs/
geophysical-data.pdf>.
64 Ibid at para 97. 
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those features by the plaintiff.  Anyone else who 
tried to collect the same underwater seismic data 
from the same locations would be unlikely to be 
able to completely replicate the data. Although 
Justice Eidsvik’s conclusion is that “the raw or field 
seismic data is an original literary compilation work 
and the processed data is both an original literary 
compilation work and an artistic compilation 
work in the scientific domain,”65 she seemed to 
recognize copyright in the data themselves rather 
than just in the overall compilations of data.66
It is generally understood that copyright protection 
requires a human author. Works that are created by 
automated processes in which human authorship is 
lacking cannot, therefore, be copyright protected.67 
This has raised concerns that the output of artificial 
intelligence (AI) processes will not be capable of 
copyright protection.68 While these debates have 
relevance in the context of AI — and by extension 
to contexts where data are generated through AI 
— they do not, by any means, determine the issue 
of whether some data are capable of protection 
under copyright law. As noted above, courts in 
Canada and the United States have found sufficient 
authorship in data generated either by non-AI 
algorithms or by complex processes such as those 
used in the collection of underwater seismic data.
The upshot of this case law is that, notwithstanding 
the general principle that there is no copyright 
in facts, data may be treated differently in both 
Canada and the United States. This is particularly 
the case with implied or derived data, as opposed 
to merely representative data. Not only is it open to 
a court to conclude that the data themselves meet 
the threshold for originality; copyright protection 
is also available to the overall compilation of data 
where there is an original selection or arrangement. 
However, in copyright law, the merger doctrine 
and the public domain nature of facts and ideas 
help ensure that the public interest is part of the 
65 Ibid at para 115.
66 Ibid at para 85; in Geophysical Service Inc, supra note 26, Justice Eidsvik 
stated, “the seismic data is an ‘original’ work.”
67 See e.g. Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty 
Ltd, [2010] FCA 44, where the High Court of Australia found that there 
was insufficient human authorship in the automated process for creating 
telephone directories.
68 See e.g. Kalin Hristov, “Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma” 
(2017) 57 IDEA 431; Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, “Generating Rembrandt: 
Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era — The 
Human-like Authors Are Already Here — A New Model” (2017) Mich St L 
Rev 659.
balance, and that copyright in data will always 
be contingent on the particular nature of the 
data and its expression. These doctrines and 
principles that limit copyright in data might be 
seen by some as disincentives to innovate, yet 
they also serve important public policy goals 
that support innovation and competition. There 
remains considerable and valuable flexibility 
in copyright law and its core principles.
A major part of the balancing of public and 
private interests in copyright law occurs through 
the fair dealing (“fair use” in the United States) 
provisions of the Copyright Act. The fair dealing 
exceptions to copyright infringement have been 
characterized as “users’ rights.”69 In Canada, to 
qualify as fair dealing, a dealing with a work must 
be for one of the purposes set out in the statute70 
and it must be “fair.”71 Fair dealing purposes are 
typically ones that serve a public interest and 
can include research, private study, criticism or 
comment, education, parody or satire.72 To the 
extent that copyright is recognized in either or 
both data and compilations of data, fair dealing 
rights would apply. This would create space for 
the equitable use of the data or compilations, for 
example, by researchers or by those seeking to 
challenge or criticize certain data or data sets.
Technological Protection Measures
The World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty (WCT)73 and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)74 both 
require signatory states to enact provisions to bolster 
the protection available to copyright owners who use 
technological protection measures (TPMs) to protect 
their content. For example, the WCT provides: “11. 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal 
protection and effective legal remedies against 
the circumvention of effective technological 
measures that are used by authors in connection 
69 CCH Canadian Ltd, supra note 24 at para 12.
70 Copyright Act, supra note 23, ss 29, 29.1, 29.2. These purposes include 
research, private study, criticism, comment, news reporting, education, 
parody and satire.
71 CCH Canadian Ltd, supra note 24 at para 50. The court goes on to 
identify six criteria for assessing the fairness of any dealing.
72 Copyright Act, supra note 23. 
73 WCT, 20 December 1996, TRT/WCT/001 (entered into force 6 March 
2002). 
74 WPPT, 20 December 1996, TRT/WPPT/001 (entered into force 20 May 
2002). 
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with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty 
or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in 
respect of their works, which are not authorized 
by the authors concerned or permitted by law.”75
Canada did not implement this part of the WCT 
or the WPPT until 2012, when amendments to the 
Canadian Copyright Act added new provisions 
designed to protect against the circumvention 
of TPMs that are put in place to protect digital 
copyright-protected works. Section 41.1(1) of the 
Canadian Copyright Act provides that “[n]o person 
shall (a) circumvent a technological protection 
measure within the meaning of paragraph (a) 
of the definition technological protection measure 
in section 41.”76 Section 41 defines a TPM as “any 
effective technology, device or component that, in 
the ordinary course of its operation, (a) controls 
access to a work, to a performer’s performance 
fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording 
and whose use is authorized by the copyright 
owner; or (b) restricts the doing — with respect 
to a work, to a performer’s performance fixed in a 
sound recording or to a sound recording — of any 
act referred to in section 3, 15 or 18 and any act for 
which remuneration is payable under section 19.”77 
Thus, to be protected under this scheme, a TPM must 
be “effective” and it may either control access to a 
work or restrict certain uses of it. The equivalent 
provision in the US Copyright Act provides: “No 
person shall circumvent a technological measure 
that effectively controls access to a work protected 
under this title.”78 In what little case law there has 
been to date in Canada, the definition of an “effective 
technological protection measure” has received a 
broad interpretation. In Nintendo of America Inc. v. 
King, the court stated: “The open-ended language 
of this definition reflects Parliament’s intention 
to empower copyright owners to protect their 
business models with any technological tool at 
their disposal.”79 In the case of TPMs that provide 
access control, such as passwords, the court 
noted that these “do not need to employ any 
barrier to copying in order to be ‘effective.’”80   
75 A similar provision is found in the WPPT, art 18.
76 Copyright Act, supra note 23, s 41.1(1) [emphasis added].
77 Ibid, s 41.
78 US Copyright Act, 17 USC § 1201(a)(1)(A).
79 Nintendo of America Inc v King, 2017 FC 246 at para 73.
80 Ibid at para 84.
While the motivation for such provisions may 
have been to provide additional protection in the 
battle against illegal copying of movies, music and 
other digital mass market works, they could have 
a significant effect on the scope of protection for 
data in copyright law. Since a compilation of data 
can be a copyright-protected work, the addition 
of TPMs to such compilations will provide a new 
level of protection for the data. This is particularly 
so in Canada, where, unlike in other countries, such 
as the United States,81 fair dealing is not a defence 
to circumvention. The result is that anyone who 
circumvents a TPM in Canada in order to access 
a compilation of data with the goal to extract the 
public domain facts contained therein, or any data 
that is unprotected under the merger doctrine, 
might not be violating copyright in the compilation, 
but could be liable for circumvention. This is a 
troubling result, as it de facto extends the degree 
of protection available for compilations of data 
to the underlying data themselves, without any 
room to apply the balancing principles found in 
the merger doctrine or in fair dealing exceptions.
Confidential Information/
Trade Secrets
Information may be protected as confidential in 
certain circumstances.82 These are described in 
article 39(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. Information 
can be protected as confidential information if it 
“(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body, 
or in the precise configuration and assembly of 
components, generally known among or readily 
accessible to persons within the circles that 
normally deal with the kind of information in 
question; (b) has commercial value because it is 
secret; and (c) has been subject to reasonable steps 
81 In the United States, courts have given a more nuanced interpretation to 
TPMs. This may, in part, be due to the wording of the US Copyright Act, 
supra note 76, which expressly addresses concerns over fair use. Section 
1201(c)(1) provides that “[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, 
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair 
use, under this title.”
82 The broad category of confidential information includes trade secrets, 
which are typically of a more industrial nature, such as formulae or 
industrial processes.
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under the circumstances, by the person lawfully 
in control of the information, to keep it secret.”83 
Canadian law is consistent with these conditions. 
The requirement that information not be “generally 
known” or “readily accessible” leaves room for 
the sharing of confidential information with, 
for example, prospective clients or investors. 
The “reasonable steps” component would 
require that any such sharing be done under the 
protection of confidentiality agreements and any 
other necessary security arrangements. 
The protection available in law for confidential 
information is not the equivalent of an ownership 
right. In R. v. Stewart,84 the SCC considered whether 
data could be “owned” for the purposes of 
determining whether it could be stolen within the 
meaning of the Criminal Code85 provisions for theft. 
The court found that data could be misappropriated 
without the “owner” being deprived of the data — 
for example, where data is memorized or copied. As 
a result, they declined to find that it was property 
for the purposes of the Criminal Code. While the 
court did not consider whether it might be property 
in other contexts, it seems unlikely. In Canada, 
the law of confidential information is based on a 
number of different areas of law, including contract 
law, the law of fiduciary relationships, equity and 
tort, all of which tend to emphasize relationships 
between individuals. Rather than providing an IP-
type monopoly, the law of confidential information 
tends to encourage fair competition and ethical 
behaviour, in part by “promoting, protecting and 
enforcing relationships founded on trust and 
confidence.”86 Courts have recognized duties of 
confidence in fiduciary relationships,87 in the 
relationship between a company and its senior 
officers,88 and in relationships between employees 
and their employers.89 Obligations of confidence 
83 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 49, art 39(2).
84 R v Stewart, [1988] 1 SCR 963, 1988 CanLII 86 (SCC) [Stewart].
85 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
86 Greg Hagen et al, Canadian Intellectual Property Law: Cases and 
Materials, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond, 2017) at 579.
87 See e.g. Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd, [1989] 2 
SCR 574, 1989 CanLII 34 (SCC), online: <http://canlii.ca/t/1ft3w>.
88 See e.g. Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O’Malley, 1973 CanLII 23 (SCC), 
[1974] SCR 592.
89 See e.g. RL Crain Ltd v RW Ashton & Ashton Press Manufacturing Co 
(1949), [1950] OR 62, [1950] 1 DLR 601 (ONCA); Imperial Sheet Metal 
Ltd v Landry, 2007 NBCA 51.
within these relationships can also be bolstered 
by contractual agreements and undertakings.
The non-proprietary nature of confidential 
information can be seen in the fact that its value 
typically lies in its confidentiality, and not in the 
information itself. Once confidentiality is lost, 
the information is often rendered valueless. The 
law of confidential information can be used to 
protect subject matter that would otherwise 
be unprotectable by other areas of IP law. For 
example, ideas cannot be protected under 
copyright law, but an idea can be shared under a 
confidentiality agreement. The law of confidential 
information can also be used to give a level of 
protection not available under other areas of IP 
law. Copyright law might protect the expression 
of a secret formula, but its commercial value is 
better protected by confidentiality. When it comes 
to inventions, while a particular invention might 
be patentable, a patent application requires full 
disclosure. An inventor might choose instead 
to protect his or her invention by maintaining 
its confidentiality in order to avoid sharing its 
details with the public (and with competitors).
Where federal and provincial laws require the 
submission of data to government for regulatory 
or other purposes, that data is typically protected 
as confidential commercial information. Access 
to information laws at the federal and provincial 
levels in Canada contain exceptions to the 
general right of access to information in the 
hands of government when it is the confidential 
commercial information of third parties.90
Relying on the law of confidential information 
to protect data may have a number of benefits, 
including the breadth of subject matter protected, 
the potentially infinite duration of protection and 
the relative paucity of public interest exceptions 
permitting access or reuse. Nevertheless, not all data 
can be protected as confidential information. For 
example, some data are necessarily broadly shared 
or are even publicly accessible.91 Further, under the 
90 See e.g. Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1, ss 20(1)(a), (b) 
[ATIA]; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, 
c F 31, s 17(1). Note that at the federal level in Canada, this is an absolute 
exception to the requirement of disclosure; there is a discretionary element 
in Ontario. These exceptions can also extend to “commercially sensitive 
information” (see e.g. ATIA [ibid], ss 20[1][c], [d]).
91 See, for example, the discussion of publicly accessible platform data in 
Teresa Scassa, “Sharing Data in the Platform Economy: A Public Interest 
Argument for Access to Platform Data” (2017) 50:4 UBC L Rev 1017 
[Scassa, “Sharing Data”].
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law of confidential information, once confidentiality 
is lost, protection is effectively at an end.
Personal Information  
Personal information is generally not capable 
of ownership — at least not by the persons to 
whom it pertains — although in recent privacy 
discourse, it is increasingly common to hear 
references to individuals “owning” their personal 
information. Certainly, the consent model of 
data protection is designed to give individuals a 
degree of control over their personal information. 
Recent developments under the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation92 around the right of 
data portability, for example, also seem to lean 
toward quasi-ownership rights. Nevertheless, 
the control provided under data protection laws 
falls short of ownership, and even data portability 
is a carefully constrained type of control.
In Canada, the SCC’s decision in McInerney v. 
McDonald 93 sheds some light on how the law 
construes the relationship between the data subjects 
and their personal information. At issue in McInerney 
was a patient’s relationship to her medical records. 
More specifically, in the words of Justice La Forest, 
it was “whether in the absence of legislation a 
patient is entitled to inspect and obtain copies of 
his or her medical records upon request.”94 One of 
the theories considered, and ultimately rejected, 
by the court was that a patient owned their 
personal medical information. Instead, the court 
found that the “physician, institution or clinic 
compiling the medical records owns the physical 
records.”95 A patient shares information with a 
doctor in the context of a relationship of trust. The 
court went on to state that “[w]hile the doctor is 
the owner of the actual record, the information is 
to be used by the physician for the benefit of the 
92 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
[2016] OJ, L 119. 
93 McInerney v MacDonald, [1992] 2 SCR 138, 1992 CanLII 57 (SCC), 
online: <http://canlii.ca/t/1fsbl>.  
94 Ibid at para 1.
95 Ibid at para 14.
patient. The confiding of the information to the 
physician for medical purposes gives rise to an 
expectation that the patient’s interest in and control 
of the information will continue.”96 Thus, the court 
recognized the property right of a doctor in the 
physical medical record97 and an “interest” on the 
part of the patient amounting to a degree of control 
over the information. The court explicitly considered 
and rejected arguments that this interest was a 
property interest. Justice La Forest stated: “I find it 
unnecessary to reify the patient’s interest in his or 
her medical records.”98 The patient’s interest was 
characterized as a right of access to the information.
Although McInerney dealt with personal health 
information, there is no reason to expect that a 
Canadian court’s decision would be different with 
respect to other types of personal information. 
Indeed, public and private sector data protection 
laws in Canada tend to follow the model sketched 
out in McInerney. Those who collect personal 
information from individuals owe certain duties to 
the individual. These include complying with the 
norms for collecting, using, disclosing, storing and 
disposing of the information, as well as managing 
the information in accordance with the consent 
provided by the individual. Individuals have a right 
to access and to correct their personal information, 
but these rights stop short of ownership rights.
Proposals to Change 
Rules of Ownership
The principles regarding the ownership of data 
that are set out above are well-established in 
Canada and are generally consistent with the 
principles in place among its major trading 
partners. Nevertheless, with the rise in the 
economic importance of data, there has been 
a corresponding interest in reopening the 
debate and discussion around data ownership 
rights. In this section, the author considers 
three of these discussions: a personal data 
96 Ibid at para 22.
97 Note that the court talked of property rights in the physical records; it did 
not address the issue of IP rights in the contents of the file.
98 Ibid at para 25.
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ownership right, a data ownership right for 
the commercial sector and data sovereignty.
Ownership of Personal 
Data
There are frequent references in popular discourse 
to individuals owning their personal information, 
although as noted earlier, this is not consistent with 
the current state of the law.99 Nevertheless, as the 
commercial value of personal information has risen, 
some have argued that individuals should be able 
to commercialize their own personal information 
by exchanging its use for compensation. Some 
of the earliest examples of this appear in the 
business literature in the late 1990s, with calls for 
the establishment of infomediaries to facilitate 
such exchanges.100 Other scholars have suggested 
that the concept of property rights should extend 
to personal information.101 Kenneth Laudon, for 
example, suggested that privacy protection required 
a market approach: “if privacy is to be taken 
seriously as a public value, the solution is to rely 
on more powerful and less wasteful mechanisms, 
like markets, to reduce privacy invasion.”102
More contemporary authors have also suggested 
different ways in which market-based solutions 
99 This paper has focused on Canadian law. Stacy-Ann Elvy offers a concise 
overview of US law, which suggests that there is no clear answer to this 
question in the United States and that the case law currently does not support 
individual ownership rights in personal data. Nevertheless, she notes that 
the evolving markets for consumer data and new start-ups giving consumers 
opportunities to commodify their data might spur a different evolution of the 
case law. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, “Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of 
the Internet of Things” (2018) 59 BC L Rev 423 at 463ff.
100 See e.g. John Hagel III & Jeffrey F Rayport, “The Coming Battle for 
Customer Information”, Harvard Business Review (1 January 1997), online: 
<https://hbr.org/1997/01/the-coming-battle-for-customer-information>.  
101 Kenneth C Laudon, “Markets and Privacy” (1996) 39:9 Commun ACM 
92–104, DOI: <10.1145/234215.234476>; Pamela Samuelson, “Privacy 
as Intellectual Property” (1999) 52 Stan L Rev 1125.
102 Laudon, supra note 101 at 104; David S Evans, “The Online Advertising 
Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy” (2009) 23:3 J Economic 
Perspectives 37.
to privacy problems might operate.103 This is 
referred to as the “personal data economy.”104 In 
recent years, start-ups have appeared that offer 
personal data management services to internet 
users. These range from companies that pay 
users for their personal information to those 
that allow users to pay supplementary fees in 
order to avoid having their personal information 
used.105 In the United States, Google has launched 
a program called “Google Crossmedia Panel,”106 
which enables users to earn money in exchange 
for information about their web-surfing habits.
Although the personal data economy is burgeoning, 
it appears to be based more on contractual models 
than on any underlying ownership right in personal 
information. While there is no evidence of any 
ownership rights particular to this context, it is 
one in which heavy regulation gives individuals 
some degree of control, in some circumstances, 
to their personal information, which in turn 
bolsters the capacity to enter into contracts about 
access to and use of personal information. 
Data Ownership Right
The commercial value and economic importance 
of data has inevitably led to calls for an ownership 
right in data. For the time being, these calls seem 
to be concentrated in the European Union, where 
103 See e.g. Wolfgang Kerber, “Digital Markets, Data, and Privacy: 
Competition Law, Consumer Law, and Data Protection”, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil (GRUR Int) (30 April 
2016) at 16, online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2770479>; Juan 
Pablo Carrascal et al, “Your Browsing Behavior for a Big Mac: Economics 
of Personal Information Online” (Proceedings of the 22nd International 
Conference on World Wide Web, New York, NY, 13–17 May 2013) at 
189, DOI: <10.1145/2488388.2488406>.
104 See e.g. Michael Haupt, “Introducing Personal Data Exchanges & the 
Personal Data Economy”, Medium.com (7 December 2016), online: 
<https://medium.com/project-2030/what-is-a-personal-data-exchange-
256bcd5bf447>. 
105 See Stacy-Ann Elvy, “Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy” 
(2017) 117:6 Colum L Rev 1369.
106 Google, “Google Crossmedia Panel”, online: <https://crossmediapanel.
com/>. 
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the idea has been floated and is being discussed.107 
Jeffrey Ritter and Anna Mayer argue that a copyright 
law framework, although evolving to protect data 
in some contexts, is ultimately inadequate for the 
task of addressing data ownership in a big data 
economy. They note that “these enormous data sets 
have nothing to do with the creative artistic assets 
that copyright law serves to protect. The data are 
industrial in nature, generated by vast networks of 
sensors that observe and record the smallest units 
of entire global supply chains.”108 The concern over 
the nature of the data seems overstated, as copyright 
law is regularly used to protect “utilitarian” 
works that are far from creative in nature and 
has proven itself to be remarkably adaptable.
Creating a data ownership right would be extremely 
challenging. If such a right were to be created, it 
would be necessary to define data for the purposes 
of its application. As discussed above, this would not 
be easy to do. Further, locating ownership may prove 
challenging.109 Data are often something in which 
there can be multiple interests. Even in the case of 
personal information, it is possible to conceive of 
competing interests in some data. For example, it 
is possible to argue that a person’s medical history, 
including their DNA, might also be the personal 
information of that person’s children. Ownership 
rights seem a blunt tool to address competing 
interests. Problems would arise across all contexts. 
If there is a data ownership right, how would 
such a right reflect factors such as the interests 
of a company that collects personal information 
and the interests of the data subjects in their 
personal information collected by that company? 
Is the right based on the source of the information 
or the investment of resources in defining the 
parameters of and harvesting that information? In 
the smart cities context, how do you factor in the 
interests of a company that supplies the hardware 
that captures data, the company that derives data 
from the captured data, the source of any other 
data used in the process of deriving new data, 
and the city that provides access to its streets and 
spaces in order to collect the data? Creating a new 
107 See e.g. Hoeren, supra note 46; Bernt Hugenholz, “Data Property: 
Unwelcome Guest in the House of IP” (Paper presented at Trading Data in 
the Digital Economy: Legal Concepts and Tools, Münster, Germany, 2017), 
online: <https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/16856245/Data_property_Muenster.
pdf>; Thomas J Farkas, “Data Created by the Internet of Things: The New 
Gold Without Ownership?” (2017) 23 Revista La Propiedad Inmaterial 5. 
108 Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, “Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct 
for Moving Forward” (2017-2018) 16 Duke L & Tech Rev 220 at 222.
109 See e.g. Farkas, supra note 107 at 7, 14. 
right would require some advance consideration 
of such complexities. It would also require 
consideration and elaboration of the necessary 
users’ rights and the need to accommodate the 
broad public interest in access to and use of data.110  
Perhaps one of the fundamental problems with 
creating a data ownership right is the fact that 
there can be so many competing interests in 
data. These interests are present not just in the 
collection or creation of the data but also in its 
use. Copyright law has maintained the principle 
that facts are in the public domain largely because 
there is a strong and complex public interest in 
this being the case. There is a significant public 
interest in facts being free to fuel new innovation or 
knowledge creation. There is also a public interest 
in individuals being free to exchange and share 
facts without risk of legal constraint. Facts are 
an essential component of expression. While the 
concept of data may be more complex than facts, 
and may involve more human agency, data still 
fuel innovation, creativity, research and expression. 
Any new law that supported data monopolies 
would risk running counter to the public interest 
and could stifle both innovation and expression.
The discussion of the need for a broader sui generis 
data ownership right is currently concentrated 
in the European Union, although even in this 
context, it appears to be losing support. This seems 
comparable to the 1990s debate over the need for 
sui generis database protection. Although Europe 
chose to pursue this route, Canada and the United 
States did not. The choice not to enact sui generis 
legislation to protect databases did not have the 
forecasted dire effects on the development of the 
database industry. Given the complexities in defining 
data, the challenges with locating ownership and 
with balancing competing interests in data, as 
well as the need to establish significant rights of 
access and use, it might be preferable to allow 
existing law to continue to evolve through the 
application of established principles, IP regimes 
and commercial devices such as contracts.
110 See e.g. Scassa, “Sharing Data”, supra note 91.
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Data Sovereignty
The term data sovereignty is used in different 
contexts. In some cases, it is used to refer to 
data localization practices. Andrew Clement, for 
example, has linked data localization to network 
sovereignty in Canada. He links Canadians’ 
loss of control over their networks to a loss of 
control over data; namely, “where it flows, who 
has access to it and what is done with it.”111
A broader concept of control over data and its 
links to fundamental sovereignty issues has been 
the subject of considerable development in the 
hands of Indigenous communities in Canada, the 
United States, Australia and New Zealand.112 A 2014 
document113 laid the groundwork for an approach 
to data sovereignty based upon the principles of 
ownership, control, access and possession (OCAP). 
The OCAP principles are holistic and address not 
only sovereignty over data about Indigenous 
peoples and communities but also sovereignty 
over the processes that determine what data is to 
be collected, by whom and how. They also address 
the lack of disaggregated data available about 
Indigenous peoples and their communities, a 
factor that makes it difficult to address some of the 
issues and challenges they face. These principles 
embrace ongoing stewardship of data, community 
capacity building and control over physical data 
infrastructure. Data sovereignty concerns and 
objectives are present in the British Columbia First 
Nations’ Data Governance Initiative (BCFNDGI)114 
and the National Inuit Strategy on Research.115
Indigenous data sovereignty movements are 
directed at ensuring greater control over all aspects 
of data governance by Indigenous communities. 
In this sense, they are not challenges to existing 
111 Andrew Clement, “Canadian Network Sovereignty: A Strategy for 
Twenty-First-Century National Infrastructure Building” CIGI, Data 
Governance in the Digital Age Special Report, 26 March 2018, online: 
<www.cigionline.org/articles/canadian-network-sovereignty>. 
112 In New Zealand, see the Maori Data Sovereignty Network, online: <www.
temanararaunga.maori.nz/>; in the United States, see the US Indigenous 
Data Sovereignty Network, online: <http://usindigenousdata.arizona.
edu/>; and in Australia, the Maiamnayri Wingara Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Data Sovereignty Group is active on these issues.
113 FNIGC, OCAP, supra note 10.
114 BCFNDGI, online: <www.bcfndgi.com/>. 
115 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), National Inuit Strategy on Research (Ottawa: 
ITK, 2018), online: <https://itk.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
National-Inuit-Strategy-on-Research.pdf>. 
rules of data ownership; rather, they are challenges 
to the current location of ownership of some 
data. Indeed, the Indigenous data sovereignty 
movement could have implications for policies 
and principles around the location of ownership 
and control of certain categories and types of 
data about Indigenous peoples. The BCFNDGI 
signals the potential need for legislation, data 
sharing and data governance agreements.116 The 
National Inuit Strategy on Research calls for 
“processes, protocols, standards, and agreements 
that allow for the safe sharing of certain 
information and for the respectful incorporation 
of Inuit knowledge in data management and 
sharing design and implementation.”117
Challenges with Data 
Ownership Rights
It is clear that the growing economic importance 
of data, including personal information, has given 
rise to increased discussion about property rights 
in data. From an industry perspective, property 
rights in data are seen to support the investment 
made not just in the collection of data but in 
its creation/generation. From a data protection 
perspective, a property rights basis for individual 
control over personal information is seen by some 
as a bulwark against unauthorized collection 
and use of personal information. Within this 
context, it is important to ask whether Canada’s 
existing law provides sufficient protection for 
data, and, if not, what more is needed to ensure 
the protection of investments in data, the proper 
protection of personal information, and the 
necessary balance of ownership rights with rights 
of access to and use of data in the public interest.
In the 1990s, it was believed by many that without 
specific laws to protect property rights in databases, 
the database industry would founder. The choice 
was made in the European Union to implement 
such protection; in North America, by contrast, 
database producers were left to rely on a patchwork 
of laws that included copyright and contract law. 
116 BCFNDGI, supra note 112 at 8.
117 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, supra note 113 at 21.
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Ultimately, it is not clear that any new law was 
needed. The EU experience may be instructive.
Copyright jurisprudence is slowly evolving to adopt 
a more complex approach to rights in data. The 
jurisprudence does not categorically exclude the 
possibility that some data are original enough to 
constitute protected works. Further, even if data 
themselves are not works, compilations of highly 
original data might be well protected, as they may 
demonstrate a strongly original selection. At the 
same time, the principles that have precluded 
the protection of facts and ideas in copyright 
law may continue to serve the public interest in 
access to and use of data that are less original to 
the producer and that form the building blocks of 
research, innovation, knowledge and expression. 
When users’ rights are added to the mix, copyright 
law might offer a flexible framework well suited 
to the complex web of interests in data.
While copyright may offer a basis for the protection 
of rights in data, it has some drawbacks that 
are worthy of attention. Copyright law evolves 
relatively slowly, and while the case law shows 
the capacity for the protection of data, it is uneven 
and unpredictable. One solution is a negotiated 
consensus at the international level on whether, 
and to what extent, data should be protected under 
copyright law. Users’ rights, while providing the 
framework to balance important public interests 
against claims of ownership, are also uncertain and 
unpredictable. Perhaps more importantly, many 
user constituencies lack the resources to fight the 
legal battles necessary to establish fair dealing. 
This creates the potential for the development of 
the law in a way that could unduly limit access 
and reuse in the broader public interest. Most 
battles over copyright in data to date have arisen 
between commercial competitors. Users’ rights 
considerations may be marginalized or undermined 
in case law that evolves uniquely in this context.
Copyright is a “one-size-fits-all” regime, and it 
is important to recognize, as well, that strong 
measures adopted to combat the unauthorized 
reproduction and dissemination of digital works 
in the entertainment sector will also apply to data 
and compilations of data. Unduly rigid protection 
for TPMs, for example, will enhance the ability 
to assert rights over data, while at the same time 
precluding a more careful balancing of interests. 
One alternative to allowing copyright law to 
develop, so as to accommodate the protection of 
data, is to create a data ownership right. While 
it might be tempting to start from scratch with a 
new right in data, the challenges are somewhat 
daunting. One primary challenge will be defining 
the data in which ownership rights can subsist. 
Another will be setting the rules for situating 
ownership — particularly given the complex ways 
in which data may be co-created. The establishment 
of a new regime will carry with it the risk of getting 
it wrong — and, as a result, of unduly burdening an 
industry that has thrived on fast-paced and flexible 
innovation. In addition to challenges of defining 
rights and locating ownership, maintaining an 
appropriate balance between ownership rights 
and the public interest in fostering innovation, and 
supporting research, criticism, free expression, 
education and creativity will be challenging.
Any creation of new ownership rights in data will 
also have implications for personal information. 
Data protection laws already recognize individual 
interests in their personal information, although 
these interests currently stop short of ownership 
rights. If ownership rights are to be recognized in 
data more generally, it will be difficult to exclude 
individuals from ownership of the personal 
information they generate simply by living their 
lives. While there is currently considerable interest 
in new means of managing personal information 
by creating personal information markets, these 
frameworks are still evolving outside a formal 
ownership regime. Once again, a new ownership 
right may reduce flexibility and increase complexity.
Within this rapidly evolving data environment, 
and with flexible and adaptable legal tools and 
principles already in place, a cautious “wait-
and-see” approach is preferable to the creation 
of a new sui generis right. This more cautious 
approach does not mean that nothing can or 
should be done. As noted earlier, there is room to 
provide more structure and guidance to courts 
— either in domestic law or through negotiation 
at the international level — as to how the rules 
of copyright law should apply to data. Attention 
should also be paid to ensuring that users’ rights 
are not neglected; the nature of data is such that 
any monopoly rights should be carefully limited to 
ensure fair rights of access and reuse in the public 
interest. Finally, any measures such as protection 
for TPMs should have their impact assessed in 
relation to rights in data, and any new proposed 
copyright reforms should also be carefully assessed 
in light of the needs of owners and users of data. 
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